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1_.hIMs_meport describes the rationale and mechanization of sensor fault tolerance
based on analytical redundancy principles. The concept involves the
substitution of software procedures, such as an observer algorithm, to supplant
additional hardware components. The observer synthesizes values of sensor
states in lieu of their direct measurement. Such information can then be used,
for example, to determine which of two disagreeing sensors is more correct, thus
enhancing sensor fault survivability. Here a stability augmentation system is
used as an example application, with required modifications being made to a
quadruplex digital flight control system. The impact on software structure and
the resultant revalidation effort are illustrated as well. Also, the use of an
observer algorithm for wind gust filtering of the angle-of-attack sensor signal
is presented.
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FOREWORD
This report describes the rationale, mechanization, analysis, and testing of
an analytical sensor redundancy modification to a double fail-operational
Stability Augmentation System. As a task in the FAA-funded contract NAS2-
11853, this effort focused on alleviating flying qualities degradation for a
relaxed static stability airplane on a system level, and on program
modifications and revalidation on a software level.
The intent of this task was to illustrate the potential benefits of software-
implemented fault tolerance as applied to sensor hardware, and to investigate
the overhead incurred in flight software and its airworthiness determination.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
An existing quadruplex digital flight control system (DFCS) was modified to
incorporate analytical sensor redundancy for improved sensor hardware fault
tolerance. Basically, this is a tradeoff of software functionality/overhead
for a reduction in system components. Such a tradeoff may be justified in
the case of a stability augmentation system (SAS) for a relaxed static
stability (RSS) airplane. If the SAS function is critical, associated
protective redundancy requires substantial sensor redundancy. In the case of
air data and inertial sensors, a useful degree of redundancy can be obtained
through an observer algorithm (Reference 2), rather than through further
replication of components.
Basically, an observer relies on knowledge of the airplane's dynamic behavior
and the flight control effector inputs, together with sensor signals as
available, to mathematically reconstruct unmeasured or questionable sensor
states. Such concepts call for new sensor voting schemes and reconfiguration
logic, but the computational requirements are not very demanding. Perhaps
the biggest problem for practical utility is that of ensuring that the
observer always captures a workable representation of the airplane dynamics,
for otherwise the estimated states will be skewed. In an actual DFCS, some
degree of inaccuracy is permissible in the form of tolerances in the fault
decision logic. Note also that additional software overhead required to
periodically update the software model of the airplane dynamics.
Since here the example application of analytical sensor redundancy was
retrofitted to an existing system, software modifications were designed to
minimize the architectural/revalidation impact. This effort focused largely
on the definition and control of interfaces of DFCS program units, and on a
clear delineation and discernment of the functionality contained within the
respective units.
i.i Executive Summary
For an augmented fly-by-wire (AFBW) system, there is no way to predict or
estimate what the pilots' input command transducers will or should be, but
the sensors of the airframe dynamics are rather accurately anticipatable
through workable knowledge of the airplane dynamics. The latter can
therefore be captured in a mathematical model called an observer system
(References 2 and 3), which is implemented in the DFCS computers to execute
in real-time in parallel with the actual airplane motion. Such a model is
depicted in Figure i, where flight hardware sensor measurements are
periodically compared with observer projections of the appropriate sensor
values.
Analytical redundancy fault detection is achieved in a manner as shown in
Figure 2. One or more of a given type airplane sensor is applied to a voter
type fault detection logic along with the associated observer output
estimate. The observer signal is then used in determining a faulted sensor,
under the assumption that only a single fault event occurs. Conventional
hardware sensor voting is normally employed until only two remaining sensors
disagree. The observer therefore constitutes a tie-breaker in the event that
two remaining sensors of a given type disagree. In a conventional DFCS, both
would be discarded as untrustworthy.
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In the case of a previously implemented DFCS at NASA Ames' Reconfigurable
Digital Flight Control System (RDFCS) simulator (see Reference i), the SAS
function for an RSS airplane was crucially dependent on angle-of-attack (AOA)
feedback to preclude a rapid pitch-axis divergence. Pitch rate was used for
improved short-period flying qualities, but this was not critical to safe
flight. Here the DFCS software was modified to incorporate an analytical
redundancy function, and the resultant sensor fault tolerance was assessed
from a reliability standpoint and demonstrated from a system failure effects
standpoint. In both cases, general effectiveness was evident.
Clearly, analytical sensor redundancy can improve system reliability under
given conditions, but the definitive issue is really life cycle costs. Do
the economies of reducing line replaceable units (LRUs) on an aircraft
warrant the additional software complexity and overhead? In the event they
do, airworthiness concerns evoked by the expanded software c mplexity and the
additional reliability assessments must be addressed. Such concerns are
explicitly treated in the remainder of this report.
Much of the software design and implementation work under the sponsoring
contract has been accomplished using the programming language Ada. Although
originally oriented toward U.S. Department of Defense applications, Ada is
now envisioned as a civil aviation standard language under ARINC auspices.
This direction is in accord with the experience of the subject work in that
the options and impact of Ada software modifications are clarified and well
controlled through the use of Ada-based design. Although the RDFCS simulator
necessitated the use of the AED (Algol Extended for Design) language for
software implementation, Ada was still used for the associated design.
Resultantly, Ada was supportive of the software redesign and revalidation
test case definition.
As a by-product of the observer implementation, the basic algorithm was shown
to be very effective in filtering wind gust components from the angle-of-
attack (AOA) sensor signals. In cases where the gust component is not
desired, the observer can effectively remove sensor noise which cannot be
accomplished through linear filtering without significant loss of signal
content. The instance of AOA- or airspeed-based autothrottles is an apt
example. Here, the gust components tend to result in spurious and
disconcerting throttle activity, which can be essentially eliminated by an
observer. For ride quality improvement, however, atmospheric sensor noise
would be valid signal content, for the DFCS would attempt to suppress the
associated airplane motion.
1.2 Assessment Problem
Three main assessment tasks were undertaken: analytical redundancy design
analysis, system reliability assessment, and test evaluation of the modified
system mechanization. The design analysis was performed via Ada program unit
examination, the reliability assessment using a substantially revised version
of CARSRA (Computer-Aided Redundant System Reliability Analysis program
(Reference 4), and the testing via non-realtime simulation. Real-time RDFCS
simulator testing was precluded by flight computer problems at the facility,
which persisted until its de-commissioning.
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1.3 Relevance to Other Contractual Tasks
Two other tasks under the FAA-sponsored contract, NAS2-I1853, were closely
related. The aforementioned quadruplex DFCS tasks addressed a rather
conventional double fail-operational DFCS for AFBW, so it reflected the
customary hardware replication approach to hardware fault tolerance. An N-
version flight software task (Reference 5) confronted the issue of the
tolerance of software faults in a manner that complemented and extended the
quadruplex design. This entailed appreciable software additions to the
overall DFCS program, which constitute the cost of achieving another
dimension of fault tolerance.
Like N-version software, the present task involves software-implemented fault
tolerance. But here the focus is on the tolerance of sensor hardware faults.
The major unifying aspect of the three tasks is the context of the same basic
quadruplex system architecture, as reflected in the same high-level software
design. This is rendered and modified as appropriate in Ada and graphics-
type representations. Here the actual implementation of the DFCS software
for the non-realtime was done in Ada as wel_.
1.4 Conclusions and Recommendations
The present example of analytical sensor redundancy was largely illustrative
of the architectural and software aspects of realizing a practical DFCS
application. Certain basic aspects, such as updating the observer system
dynamics in accord with that of the airplane's, have not been addressed
fully. Nonetheless, the viability of observer type algorithms has been
indicated in some meaningful degree. In the absence of the originally
intended DFCS system demonstration (because of the de-commissioning of the
RDFCS facility), it is now possible to demonstrate the analytical sensor
redundancy through non-realtime simulation. This could be instructive in a
tutorial context, but the need and justification does not appear to exist.
For the present, it seems sufficient to discern the basic concepts through
reports such as this one, and to defer further depth of inquiry until
specifics a full-scale implementation arise.

2.0 BACKGROUND
Observer algorithms are derived from a state-space formulation of a controls
problem as described for example in Reference 6. Airplane dynamics are
traditionally represented as a system of continuous-time, second-order
ordinary differential equations (e.g., see Reference 7), and are solved on a
digital computer by numerical integration. The corresponding state-space
form is normally a system of first-order differential equations expressed in
matrix form, as shown in Figure 3. This system of differential equations is
usually converted to a corresponding set of first order difference equations
to realize a discrete-time solution on a digital computer.
In Figure 3, the forcing functions are horizontal stabilizer, or flying tail,
and engine throttles. These inputs are used to trim the airplane and to
effect changes in airplane motions to achieve intended flight paths. The
basic response of the airplane is reflected in the state vector x, in state
variables such as vertical velocity or pitch rate. Since certain states like
vertical velocity are not readily measured or are not of much interest, the
associated response is actually captured by the measurement vector _, which
comprises the variables actually measured by the airplane sensors. Here,
true airspeed and AOA are called air data: pitch, pitch rate, and normal
acceleration are termed inertial data,
As noted earlier, an observer algorithm in a DFCS computer must accurately
reflect airplane dynamics, and it does so through recourse to a state-space
representation. Observer development is presented in Section 4.0, but here
it is appropriate as background to understand the generalities of modeling
airplane dynamics. Note that the airplane dynamics are obviously continuous
time phenomena, even if simulated in discrete time. Of necessity, the
observer dynamics are implemented in discrete time in a DFCS, building upon
the representation in Figure 3.
2.1 Abbreviations
AFBW Augmented Fly-by-Wire
AOA Angle-of-Attack
CG Center-of-Gravity
DFCS Digital Flight Control System
DOF Degrees of Freedom
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
RDFCS Reconfigurable Digital Flight Control System
RSS Relaxed Static Stability
SAS Stability Augmentation System
WRT With Respect To
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Figure 3. Airplane Dynamics Block Diagram (Sheet 2 of 2)
2.2 Managed Flying Qualities Degradation
With the increasing prevalence of RSS airplanes, pitch-axis flying qualities
have become a more compelling concern because of the accompanying reduction
or loss of inherent airframe stability. As an airplane's CG moves aft, the
capacity of its wing to generate a nose down moment in response to an
increase in AOA diminishes. At the neutral point, no pitching moment change
results from an AOA change. If the CG is moved still farther aft, an
increase in AOA yields a destabilizing pitch-up moment. This condition,
which is referred to as a negative longitudinal stability margin, produces an
absolute pltch-axis divergence. If at all rapid, such a divergence renders
the airplane difficult or impossible to fly.
Consequently, a pitch stability augmentation system (SAS) function is
normally added to the flight control system to restore airframe stability to
adequate levels through active controls. Stability augmentation involves the
feedback of inertial or air data sensor signals. This "inner loop" feedback
improves the apparent stability of the airframe and provides acceptable
flying qualities. A general pitch SAS mechanization is depicted in Figure 4,
which is an expanded version of the pitch-axis state variable representation
of the rigid-body equations of motion presented in Figure 3. The state
variables are the elements of the vector N, and the sensor measurement
variables are the elements of the vector _. In the latter case, true
airspeed and AOA correspond to air data sensors, and pitch attitude, pitch
rate, and incremental vertical acceleration constitute inertial sensors. The
SAS feedback is routed through the gain matrix K. Intuitively, the poor
flying qualities of the free, unaugmented RSS airplane that are inherent in
the system matrix A, are offset by the augmentation provided by sensor
feedback through K.
Since the SAS function is often necessary for safe readily controllable
flight, over all or most of the flight regime, its continued proper operation
must be ensured through redundant system components. In a redundant SAS
architecture, there are generally two or more pitch-axis sensor signals fed
back for the SAS function, e.g., AOA, normal acceleration, and pitch rate.
So long as two of a given type of sensor are operating in agreement, that
signal is available for the SAS computation. The differing nature of the
various types of signals means that they make different contributions to
flying qualities. Hence, the failure effects for the total loss of a signal
type vary as well, but in general each loss results in some degradation of
SAS performance. The intent of managed degradation is to minimize the degree
as well as the frequency of performance degradation.
Analytical sensor redundancy supports a managed degradation strategy in that
it permits at least one additional LRU failure of a given type before total
loss of the corresponding signal. This can be accomplished through the use
of the observer algorithm to determine which of two disagreeing sensors is
discrepant. Then the operable sensor can be kept on line. Otherwise, the
onset of flying qualities degradation, and perhaps loss of a critical
function, would occur more often. Although analytical sensor redundancy is
possible as a DFCS software add-on, the overall system architecture and the
fault degradation profile need to be designed in a comprehensive manner.
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2.3 Sensor Fault Tolerance Concepts
Sensor fault tolerance is the accommodation of hardware faults which is
usually based on some type of comparator scheme. One typical example is
provided by the companion investigation on N-version programming (Reference
5). Here two to four sensors were voted using a low median select strategy
wherein all presumably normal voter inputs were compared with the selected
signal. Essentially the same scheme is depicted for triplex pitch rate gyro
sensors in Figure 5. Due to admissible sensor variations, both time and
amplitude thresholds are employed by the comparators to eliminate nuisance
trips. As noted earlier, this scheme is unable to discriminate which of just
two disagreeing sensors is correct, unless other information exists to
support the decision. This might be provided by a sensor validity signal,
which may not be available or dependable.
More encompassing supplementary fault decision information can be furnished
by analytical redundancy mechanisms, as previously reported in Reference 6.
There are many possible variations, particularly with respect to fault
decision logic. In Figure 2, a conventional comparator mechanization was
modified to accept an analytically synthesized sensor signal into an
associated software voter. The logic could be set up such that the
synthesized signal would be invoked only when needed to discriminate a
disagreeing pair of sensors. Note that the illustrative calculations in
Section 4.0 indicate worthwhile improvements in system reliability where a
triplex set of sensors is flight critical.
2.4 Observer Theory
The reconstruction of a non-measured signal can be achieved using Kalman
filtering or an observer algorithm. The latter is simpler and quite
satisfactory for airplane inertial and air data sensors. Observer algorithm
theory per se was developed in References i and 2, based on a mathematical
modeling characterization of the dynamic behavior of a deterministic physical
system and its forcing functions. For an airplane, this relates to airplane
motion in response to flight controller inputs, e.g., elevator surface
displacement, as evident in measurements of dynamic states, e.g., pitch rate.
Where a measured variable is not state variable, the associated
transformation must exist and be known from measurements to all states. In
particular, the states must be observable in a mathematical sense (e.g., see
Reference 6), as is normally the case.
The foregoing relationships are best indicated through visualizing the two
separate systems shown in Figure 6. The rigid body airplane dynamics are the
same as presented in Figures 3 and 4. The second system is the observer,
described here as a system of first-order differential equations similar to
those descriptive of the airplane dynamics. The observer system, however,
exists only as corresponding difference equations in computer software. Note
that its system matrix is D, and that it has two forcing functions, the
sensor measurement vector _ as well as the flight controller vector _. The
matrices D, E, and F of the observer system are derived from the airplane's
behavior as captured in matrices A, B, and C. Hence, the observer in general
contains the essential information about the airplane's behavior to
reconstruct unmeasurable states, e.g., those whose sensors are inoperable.
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For the observer derivation shown in Figure 6, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between airplane states _ and observer states _. Thus, the
observer states need only be converted using the measurement matrix C to
enable a direct cross-comparison with the various sensor signals. Ideallyl
the the observer system can function without the measurement vector X
feedback, but uncertainties regarding the actual airplane dynamics compromise
such a modeling approach. Sensor feedback driving the observer, therefore,
captures actual state coupling inherent in the actual airplane dynamics.
Of course, as the airplane traverses a given flight profile, its dynamic
behavior will vary quite appreciably. This is reflected in the elements of
matrices A, B, and C. It is therefore necessary to update the observer
system matrices, D, E, and F, over a corresponding sequence of airplane trim
points or operating points. Otherwise, the sensor comparison becomes
invalid. The observer system updating also involves discretization of the
observer dynamics to permit digital computation. Normally, this is a
background mode computation that entails non-negligible overhead.
2.5 Software Modifications and Revalidation
Here the analytical redundancy was added to the existing quadruplex DFCS
(Reference i), with the predominant impact, affecting the flight software.
The need then is to determine the scope of software modifications, and in
turn, the focus of the revalidation effort. The latter calls for multilevel
testing, and hence, analytical test case definition. At the system level,
sensor failure effects testing is ostensibly the same as for strictly
replicated hardware redundancy. At the lower levels of testing, observations
are directed toward confirming consistency with the verified system/software
re-design. With properly selected test cases, such consistency assurances
strengthen the confidence that the modified DFCS mechanization can cope
satisfactorily with conditions and inputs not actually applied during
testing.
Basically, exhaustive testing of software is not possible, even with
automated testing, so the best use must be made of test time and resources.
The revalidation test case definition must emphasize new requirements,
modified interfaces, and new or altered software. It must confirm that the
rules or assumptions used in reliability assessment are valid. For overall,
general confidence in the modified DFCS, some regression testing must be
performed as well to ensure that unintended changes have not inadvertently
occurred, especially those outside the defined scope of modifications.
2.6 Testing Activities
Figure 7 summarizes the types and orientations of testing activities that
originate in various stages of software development. The development results
associated with each of these'stages contribute to the definition of the
multilevel test cases as implemented functions (e.g., see Reference 7).
These respective testing contributions can be related to the analytical
sensor redundancy modifications to indicate the nature and scope of testing
necessary. All the levels of testing can to some extent be accomplished
during real-time system simulation, as is described here. But this assumes
that extensive low-level software testing and flight software load module
integration have already been accomplished.
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D --> OBSERVER SYSTEM MATRIX
E --> SENSOR FORCING FUNCTION MATRIX
F _ FLIGHT CONTROLS FORCING FUNCTION
MATRIX
Z _ OBSERVER STATE VECTOR
OBSERVER SYSTEM FORM: _ = Dz + E_ + Fu
SUBSTITUTE OBSERVER ASSUMPTION: z = y ; __ =
--> _ = Dy + Ey + Fu
NEXT, SUBSTITUTING: y = Cx & _ = C_
--> C_ = (D + E)Cx + Fu
PRE-MULTIPLYING THE AIRFRAME DYNAMICS EQUATION BY C
--> Cx = CAx + CBu
EQUATING THE COEFFICIENTS OF x and u IN THE LAST TWO
EQUATIONS:
--> F = CB & CA = (D + E)C
NOTE THAT MATRICES A, B, AND C ARE KNOWN A PRIORI,
AND HENCE MATRIX F CAN BE SOLVED FOR DIRECTLY.
MATRICES D AND E ARE NOT DEFINED AT THIS POINT, BUT
THERE IS ONLY ONE EQUATION FOR THESE TWO UNKNOWNS.
HENCE, D IS SOMEWHAT ARBITRARILY SELECTED TO BE A
DIAGONAL MATRIX, AND IN TURN, E IS SELECTED TO BE A
MATRIX WITH ALL MAIN DIACONAL ELEMENTS SET TO ZERO.
Figure 7. Observer System Sensor Fault Detection (Sheet 2 of 2)
17
The addition of analytical sensor redundancy to an existing DFCS would
normally involve system specification changes, but in all likelihood the
system requirements would not be changed. In turn, the system/software
design and the software implementation would necessarily be modified. The
software re-design would reflect structural program changes in the form of
both added and modified software units, with accompanying interface changes.
Although some source code changes would appear in the program structure, most
would occur within the new or modified software units. Ada program unit
specifications aid in highlighting the scope of such changes, and explicitly
define the revised interfaces.
Multilevel testing then would focus primarily on the changes purposefully
introduced into the DFCS software. These would include performance,
coverage, and correctness oriented test case definition strategies to examine
the functional, structural, and causal aspects of the modified software.
These aspects of testing are expanded in Table i relative to the analytical
sensor redundancy modification. Obviously, considerable sensor fault cases
are necessary to exercise both attendant logic and the control algorithms.
regression testing would address other DFCS modes and functions outside the
scope of the intended modifications, and would include for example some
requirements oriented testing. The purpose would be to ensure that no side
effects or inadvertent changes had been introduced.
18
TABLE1 MULTILEVEL TEST CASE EXAMPLES
DEVELOPMENT TESTING TYPE OF DFCS FEATURES TYPE OF
STAGE LEVEL FOCUS TESTING OF INTEREST OBSERVATIONS
Requirements
Specification
i|
Design
Implementation
General Utility
Explicit Design
Requirements
Software Designl
Features
Source Code
Behavior
Regression
Faulted
Performance
Struct-:ral,
Path &
Interfaces
Control &
Logic
Functions
System Operation
Managed Flying
Degradation
Mode Switching,
Status & Timing
Control Laws,
Deriving Observer
& DFCS Logic
Overall
Acceptability
Pitch SAS
Performance
Path Traversal
& Function
Invocation
Logic, Count
& Control
Variables
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3.0 OBJECTIVES
As with the other tasks under the sponsoring contract, the general objective
of this task was to explore certain aspects of fault tolerant DFCSs that
might be employed where the performance of critical functions must be ensured
despite multiple faults. In particular, the emphasis here was on sensor
faults for the pitch SAS function. The intent has been to illustrate the
mechanization of analytical redundancy in extending sensor fault tolerance.
Additionally, issues of re-design and revalidation have been introduced
because the analytical redundancy features were added to an existing DFCS
configuration.
3.1 Goal
The goal of this task has been to motivate, illustrate, and critique a
representative example of analytical sensor redundancy similar to that which
might appear in a DFCS submitted for airworthiness certification. It is
intended that certain pivotal issues and viable approaches to enhanced or
more economical system reliability will thereby be exemplified. More
specifically, the mechanics and efficacy of observer algorithms will
hopefully be shown to be plausible and a worthwhile usage of digital
processing capacity.
3.2 Task Objectives
The specific objectives of this task are threefold:
o to explain the operation of an observer algorithm as used for DFCS
analytical sensor redundancy
o to indicate the system architecture tradeoffs in terms of system
reliability and implementation overhead
o to illustrate the revalidation process attendant to a major DFCS
modification.
3.3 Scope
As with several other tasks, the analytical sensor redundancy effort has been
limited to part of a typical DFCS pitch axis. It is felt that the basic
principles of sensor fault tolerance can be better understood by a suitably
bounded application example. Also, a straightforward observer algorithm is
used rather than a much more complicated Kalman filter. Additionally, not
all of the software needed for updating the observer dynamics has been
included.
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT _ILMED
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
A system architecture was selected based on an analytical sensor redundancy
modification to the previously developed quadruplex DFCS (Reference i). The
new configuration was based on minimizing the impact on the existing DFCS
implementation, while rendering a safe yet more economical design. Although
the system simulator implementation at NASA Ames was programmed using
Rockwell-Collins' augmented AED (Algol Extended for Design) instruction set,
the software design was in Ada for improved clarity.
4.1 Analytical Redundancy Concepts
In addition to the requirement for observability of airplane states, Sheet 2
of Figure 6 noted two matrix equations whose was satisfaction was necessary
in the development of the particular observer used here. The concluding
statement there also indicated that Matrix D was to be a diagonal matrix and
in juxtaposition, Matrix E was to have all zero elements on the main
diagonal.
The D-Matrix choice was based on two aspects of simplifying observer system
updating during flight: term-by-term exponentiation along the main diagonal,
rather than matrix exponentiation; and similarly, term-by-term inversion
along the main diagonal, rather than matrix inversion. The associated choice
of zeroing the main diagonal of the E-Matrix means that no observer state is
a direct function of its measured value, which after all may be erroneous or
in question.
The expanded derivation and general result of this development in the form of
the observer matrices definitions are presented in Figure 8. Here the
variables are as defined in Figure 6. Note that certain reasonable
simplifications have been made, e.g., the longitudinal airplane equations of
motion have been reduced from six to four degrees-of-freedom. The forms of
the Matrices A, B, and C were dictated, respectively, by: general airplane
dynamics, the particular flight control effectors, and the selected
complement of sensors. These are known quantities, expressed as variables,
for purposes of defining the observer matrices.
Matrix-F is readily defined element-by-element in terms of Matrices B and C
as noted at the bottom of Sheet I of Figure 8. Matrices D and E then take
three sheets to develop under the above stated constraints. On Sheet 4, 30
matrix coefficients are then expressed in terms of 25 simple equations.
Accordingly, five variables are parameters, selected here to ensure no zero
values for this set of matrix elements. Of course, this computation was
automated, as was the discretization algorithm to transform these continuous-
time observer matrices into those for the corresponding dlscrete-time system,
as preferred for digital computation.
4.2 Reliability Assessment
Analytical redundancy, in the subject case at least, was not invoked until
only two of a given type of sensor remain on-line. Then the observer served
as a tie-breaker in the event that the two sensors disagree. Hence, the
reliability assessment here is in terms of dual sensors, in the context of
system reliability improvements provided by the observer-based fault
23
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I. Airframe Equations
From the Airplane Equations of Motion:
A m
B m
n
all a12
a21 a22
a31 a32
0 0
bll b12
b21 O
b31 b32
0 0
a13 a14
For the Selected Sensor Set:
C i
a23
a33
a43
a24
0
0
n
Cll 0 0 0
0 c22 0 0
0 O c33 0
0 0 0 c44
0 c52 0 0
II. Observer Equations
For the Given Observer Deviation
F - CB -
m
bll b12
b21 0
b31 b32
0 0
B
Cll 0 0 0
0 c22 0 0
0 0 c33 O
0 0 0 c44
0 c52 0 0
n m
b!iCll bl2Cll
b21c22 0
b31c33 b32c33
0 0
b21c52 0
[4x4]
[4x2]
[5x4]
[5x2]
Figure 8 Observers Matrix Determination (Sheet I of 4)
24
D m
m u
w
Cll
0
CA- 0
0
0
(D+E)C -
dll
0
0
0
0
0
e21
e31
e41
e51
0 0 0
d22 0 0
0 d33 0
0 0 d44
0 0 0
el2 el3 el4
0 e23 e24
e32 0 e34
e42 e43 0
e52 e53 e54
IIcA.co+ i clJ
_m
0 0 0
c22 0 0
0 c33 0
c52 0
dll el2 el3 el4 el5
e21 d22 e23 e24 e25
e31 e32 d33 e34 e35
e41 e42 e43 d44 e45
e51 e52 e53 e54 d55
all a12 a13 a14
a21 a22 a23 a24
a31 a32 a33 0
0 0 a43 0
m
n
w
Cll
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
d55
el5
e25
e35
e45
0
m
allCll al2Cll al3Cll al4Cll
a21c22 a22c22 a23c22 a24c22
a31c33 a32c33 a33c33 0
0 0 a43c44 0
a21c52 a22c52 a23c52 a24c52
0
c22
0
0
c52
m
0 0
0 0
c33
0 c44
0 0
{5x5]
[5x5]
[5x4]
Figure 8 Observers Matrix Determination (Sheet 2 of 4)
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(D+E)C-
m
clldll (C22e12+C55e15) ¢33e13 c44e14
Clle21 (c22d22+c52e25) c33e23 c44e24
Clle31 (c22e32+c52e35) c33d33 c44e34
clle41 (c22e42+c52e45) c33e43 c44d44
Clle51 (c22e52+e52d55) c33e53 c44e54
Clle41 (c22e42+c52e45) c33e43 c44d44
Clle51 (c22e52+c52d55) c33e53 c44e54
Observer Matrix Element Solutions:
D m
allCll al2Cll al3Cll al4Cll
a21c22 a22c22 a23c22 a24c22
a31c3B a32c33 a33c33 0
0 0 a43c44 0
a21c52 a22c52 a23c52 a24c52
0 0 a43c44 0
a21c52 a22c52 a23c52 a24c52
dll - all
e21 - a21c22/Cli
e31 - a31c33/Cli
e41 - 0
eSl - a21c52/Cli
Assign All Non-Zero
el3 - a13cli/C33
e23 - a23c22/c33
d33 - a33
e43 - a43c44/c33
e53 - a23c52/c33
el2 - (a12Cll-C52e15)/c22
d22 - (a22c22-c52e25)/c22
e32 - (a32c33-c52e35)/c22
e42 - -c52e45/c22
e52 - (a22c52-c52d55)/c22
el4 - a14cli/C44
e24 - a24c22/c44
e34 _ 0
d44 - 0
e54 - a24c52/c44
Let el5 =_
, Let e25
arameters
, Let e35 -_Selection
, Let e45
; Let d55
Figure 8 - Observers Matrix Determination (Sheet 3 of 4)
26
III. Particular Assignments
Simplifications per the Present Case:
w
bllCll
b21c22
F - b31c33
0
b21c52
Cl I - c33 - c44 - i
dll - all
e21 - a21c22
e31 - a31
e41 - 0
eSl - a21c52
0
0
0
0
0
For Throttles Fixed
For Our Case
el2 - (a12 - c52e15)/c22
d22 - (a22 - c52e25)/c22
e32 - (a32 - c52e35)/c22
c42 - -c52e45/c22
e52 - (a22c52 - c52d55)/c22
el3 - a13 el4 - a14 el5 -
e23 - a23c22 e24 - a24 e25 -
d33 _ a33 e34 - 0 e35 -
e43 . a43 d44 -0 e45 -
m
e54 - a23c52 e54 - a24c52 d55
arameters
Selection
Figure 8 - Observers Matrix Determination (Sheet 4 of 4)
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isolation. Figure 9 then illustrates three variants of a dual system, where
contrasts are to be made regarding the contributions of self test/analytical
redundancy combinations.
In Sheet i of Figure 9, faulting of certain components are assumed to he
obvious, e.g., non-engagable servo, and this is represented by parallel
boxes. Note that paralleling denotes logical OR-ing to attain a operable
system, and serial boxes denote logical AND-ing. As evident in Sheet 2,
self test increases the extent of parallelism, which translates into improved
system reliability. Sheet 3 reflects the contributions of analytical
redundancy in that pairs of sensors are not linked in serial fashion, i.e.,
both sensors need not be working to have a usable signal output.
Quantitative assessment results for these three configurations are
represented in Table 2. The fault isolation capacity of self test is seen to
only modestly improve system reliability, in part because it does not affect
sensor aspects of reliability. Analytical redundancy, however, does improve
reliability quite significantly (by three orders of magnitude), as the
results show. Of course, the benefits of analytical redundancy would be much
less for triplex sensor, because it would be involved less often. Note that
the combination of self test and analytical redundancy are complementary, for
they are suited for different types of fault isolation. Their combination is
therefore natural and very beneficial.
4.3 Simulation Investigation
Simulation time histories of observer states versus sensor measurements
states are given in Figure i0. Even under multiple sensor signal losses, the
observer outputs match well with those of the sensors. This is not
surprising for such a short duration in which that airplane dynamics have
been represented exactly, and where re-trimming or other airplane changes,
e.g., fuel burn-off, have not occurred. In practice, such concerns can be
handled using additional flight software, as well as normal sensor signal
tolerances.
4.4 Observer Gust Filtering
A scheme for using the observer algorithm for gust component filtering of the
AOA signal is depicted in Figure ii. The wind forcing function vector is w,
and it directly excites the airplane through Matrix B, but not the observer
dynamics. Hence, the observer states do not reflect the wind forcing
functions, in particularly with regard to the AOA signal. Hence, the
observed AOA can be fed back into the DFCS less the atmospheric noise
component present on the AOA vane output.
This effect is illustrated in the simulation time histories presented in
Figure 12. AOA is essentially proportional to vertical velocity, or plunge,
a signal that directly reflects vertical gusts. The corresponding observer
signal is seen to be relatively free of the gust component, and hence it can
be used advantageously for long term control functions like autothrottles.
In certain cases however, like ride qualities control, the AOA gust component
actually constitutes a meaningful signal, so filtering there would be
inappropriate. In general, observers can be very useful because their filter
characteristics are not strictly frequency dependent, a criteria that may not
necessarily distinguish sensor signal content from the noise.
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5.0 SUMMARY
Basically, the technical feasibility and benefits of analytical sensor
redundancy have been illustrated. The major benefit of extended likelihood
of maintaining safe flying qualities has been demonstrated for a negative RSS
transport airplane. Marginal reliability improvements have been calibrated,
and the impact on validation/revalidation indicated.
Ultimately, the decision to employ analytical sensor redundancy is found to
be primarily an economic one, for conventional sensor redundancy and
reliability levels are quite adequate at present. Still, the tradeoff
between reduced sensors and increased software overhead may in certain cases
favor analytical redundancy, particularly where its use is also warranted by
associated nonlinear filtering applications. There, DFCS performance
benefits may prove to be vital.
- *'_ NOT FILMED
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